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16	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA						
17	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION						
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19	VERNELL LUNDBERG, et al.,) Case No. C-97	Case No. C-97-3989-SI				
20	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' COSTS OBJECTIONS					
21	V.)	20 0022 02020110112				
22	COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT, et al.,))					
	Defendants.	Date:	July 29, 2005				
2324		Courtroom:	9:00 a.m. 10 Hon. Susan Illston				
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I. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS UNDER F.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)

There is a strong *presumption* that a prevailing party is entitled to costs (not including attorney's fees), which the losing party must overcome. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that "costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed *as of course* to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). "By its terms, the rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs." <u>Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California</u>, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000).

However, the district court's discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party is limited and the court must "specify reasons" for its refusal. <u>Id.</u> (citation omitted). Given the presumption "that costs are to be awarded as a matter of course in the ordinary case," the court is required to "explain why a case is not 'ordinary' and why, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to award costs." <u>Id.</u> at 593.

Some reasons for denying costs include misconduct by the prevailing party and the losing party's limited financial resources. <u>Id.</u> at 592. Neither of these reasons applies to this case. Plaintiffs have not engaged in any misconduct, and Defendants City of Eureka and Humboldt County, and their respective law enforcement departments, do not have such limited resources that would justify denying Plaintiffs costs; as stated in footnote 13 of Plaintiffs' reply brief, defendants have liability insurance for millions of dollars. Furthermore, it is *Plaintiffs* who have extremely limited financial resources. [Lundberg Decl. (filed June 30, 2005) ¶5.] Being prevailing parties, Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated, consistent with the Federal Rules, for the costs incurred during the past eight years of litigation.

While *other circuits* have denied a prevailing plaintiff costs due to a nominal damages award in civil rights cases, the Ninth Circuit has not yet chosen to do so. In Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 592 n.15, the court explicitly held that a great disparity between the amount of damages sought and the amount awarded can justify denial of costs in a *contract claim*, but it did "not address the propriety of these reasons in non-contract actions." Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016,1023 (9th Cir. 2003). In any event, as Plaintiffs explained in their opening Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Costs Objections CASE NO. C-97-3989-SI

brief, they did not ask for a specific or large amount of money, either in their pleading papers or at trial, and have always focused on the important principle of this case. [Lundberg Decl. (filed June 30, 2005) ¶3.] More importantly, as this case has achieved significant successes in addition to the nominal damages award.

Defendants argue that costs incurred by Plaintiffs' attorneys in the first trial (Macon Cowles and Mark Harris) should not be taxed because the trial resulted in a hung jury. However, the Federal Rules provide that a prevailing party is entitled to all costs. Plaintiffs in this case are prevailing parties because they received a judgment enforceable against defendants on the claim of excessive force. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs who receive nominal damages are prevailing parties under §1988); see also Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that the prevailing party requirement is generally the same for the purposes of costs and attorney's fees and finding that plaintiff was the prevailing party for the purpose of costs because he was awarded nominal damages); Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2003). It is of no consequence that *individual attorneys* from earlier stages of the litigation were no longer involved at the time judgment was entered. *Plaintiffs* prevailed and so are entitled to all costs incurred during all stages of this litigation that ultimately lead to the favorable verdict.

II. THE CHARGES RELATED TO VIDEOTAPE PRODUCTION SHOULD BE TAXED

The \$1079 cost incurred in the preparation of video exhibits is reimbursable under Local Rule 54-3(d)(5), which states "The cost of preparing . . . videotapes . . . to be used as exhibits is allowable." These were videotapes of the incidents themselves and were reasonably necessary to assist the juries in understanding the issues at trial.

Additionally, the \$267.27 for videotapes used in taking the depositions of defense witnesses is reimbursable as part of the cost incurred in videotaping a deposition. Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC, 115 F.3d 1471,1477 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that F.R.C.P. 30(b)(2)-(3) and 28 U.S.C. §1920(2), when read together, authorize taxation of the costs of video depositions); Nicolaus v. West Side Transp., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 608, 612 n.2 (D.Nev. 1999) ("[T]he costs of videotaping and transcribing a deposition are taxable"); Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation in Tilton). The cost of blank videotapes is a part Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Costs Objections CASE NO. C-97-3989-SI

1	of the	of the cost necessarily incurred in videotaping depositions. It is irrelevant that an attorney, and not							
2	a certified videographer paid for these videotapes and taped the deposition. Plaintiffs are not								
3	claiming costs for the attorney's time in videotaping the deposition, only the raw materials – the								
4	blank	blank videotapes.							
5	III.	CONCLUSION							
6		The entire amount claimed in Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs should be taxed. Defendants have not							
7	overc	vercome the strong presumption that Plaintiffs are entitled to costs.							
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9	DAT	ΓED: July 20, 2005	BY:						
10				Sophia S. Cope FIRST AMENDMENT PROJECT					
11				Fee Counsel for Plaintiffs					
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